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‘A Political Monopoly Held by One Race’: 




The University of Queensland 
	  
In at least some parts of Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi 
subgroups have existed since pre-colonial times.  Under 
German and Belgian colonial rule, the distinction between 
the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority was perceived as a 
racial distinction.  The Tutsi minority was regarded as 
racially superior, and given privileged access to education 
and indigenous positions of authority. Over time, this 
perception of Tutsi superiority was both institutionalized 
and internalised within Rwandan society.  The ‘Hutu 
Awakening’ during the 1950s, however, saw issues 
surrounding race and privilege become highly politicised. 
As decolonisation loomed, the intersections between race 
and power became sites of bitter contestation.  The Tutsi 
elite, long accustomed to their privileged status, sought to 
retain their hegemony through a rapid transition to 
independence utilising the existing power structure.  The 
nascent Hutu counter-elite, by contrast, desperately 
sought access to the organs of power, lest they be 
‘condemned forever to the role of subordinate manual 
workers, and this, worse still, after achieving an 
independence which they will have unwittingly helped to 
obtain’ (Niyonzima and others 1957: 3). Utilising a range 
of primary documents from the period, including 
manifestos of political parties, statements of leaders, and 
documents tabled at the United Nations Trusteeship 
Council, this paper
 will analyse the intersection of race and politics during the 
last decade of colonial rule in Rwanda.  The roots of the 
Mayersen: Ethnicity in Rwanda   
	   168	  
ethnic hatred that led to the 1994 genocide can be traced 




“The most advanced elements among the Bahutu are 
stirring, and beginning to make overt demands”, reported 
the United Nations (UN) Visiting Mission to the Trust 
Territory of Rwanda in 1957 (15).1  Under the auspices of 
the UN Trusteeship Council, the triennial missions to this 
Belgian colony had both oversight and advisory functions.  
The previous mission, in 1954, had declared “There 
appeared to be very little development of general or even 
local public opinion” (United Nations 1954: 2) in the 
country; by 1960, however, the subsequent mission 
reported on the first major interethnic violence there 
(United Nations 1960).  In a remarkably short period, 
relations between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority 
had become highly politicised, polarised, bitter and 
violent.  Racially motivated violence plagued the country 
during the independence process.  By July 1962, when the 
country declared independence, some 100,000 Tutsi had 
fled as refugees (Webster 1966: 84); just eighteen 
months later ethnic massacres would claim the lives of 10-
14,000 Tutsi (Segal 1964: 15; Lemarchand 1970: 225).  
This chapter will analyse how, and why, issues 
surrounding ethnicity so quickly became critical during the 
decolonisation period.  It proposes that between 1954 and 
1959, when ethnicity emerged as a major political issue in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The UN Trust Territory was officially the Trust Territory of 
Ruanda-Urundi, but Rwanda and Burundi were administered 
separately.  Statements utilised throughout this paper from Trust 
Territory documents and reports refer to Rwanda only.  For 
consistency, modern spelling of Rwanda is utilised throughout, 
however original spelling is retained within direct quotes. 
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Rwanda, three key factors combined to provoke extreme 
levels of ethnic polarisation.  Together, these explain the 
high levels of interethnic violence that surrounded 




Rwanda has a long history of ethnic diversity, with the 
majority Hutu comprising approximately 85 per cent of the 
population, and the minority Tutsi 15 per cent.2  A third 
group, the Twa, comprise less than 1 per cent.  In at least 
some parts of the country, Hutu and Tutsi subgroups have 
existed since pre-colonial times.  Tutsi were traditionally 
pastoralists, with a small Tutsi elite comprising the ruling 
class, while Hutu were traditionally agriculturalists, of 
generally lower status.  The distinction between the Hutu 
majority and Tutsi minority subgroups has been varyingly 
described as one of race, tribe, caste, class, domination 
and subjugation, ethnicity and political identity.  Each 
descriptor appears to have more than a kernel of truth, 
but also elements of distortion and inaccuracy.  Moreover, 
the nature of these identities is not a static one, as they 
have changed over time and in response to both internal 
and external influences.  Whereas today these identities 
are commonly referred to as ethnic identities (and will be 
referred to as such within this chapter), for much of 
Rwanda’s history they were considered racial.  For most of 
the period of German (1894-1916) and Belgian (1916-
1962) colonial rule, the Tutsi minority was regarded as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  A note on the terminology used in this chapter.  Kinyarwanda 
is a language that uses prefixes extensively, but in conformance 
with general practice in academic writing on Rwanda, the terms 
‘Hutu’, ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Twa’ will be used without prefixes, to denote 
both singular and plural.  In Kinyarwanda the prefix ‘mu’ denotes 
singular, and ‘ba’ plural.  Where quotes include these prefixes, 
they have not been altered. 
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racially superior, and given privileged access to education 
and indigenous positions of authority.3  Over time, this 
perception of Tutsi superiority was both institutionalised 
and internalised within Rwandan society.  Even as late as 
1959, Belgium’s annual report to the UN on the Trust 
Territory helpfully included a photo of the Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa ‘racial types’ (type de race) (Belgian Government 
1959).   
 
Belgium managed the Trust Territory of Rwanda through a 
system of indirect rule, utilising the indigenous Tutsi elite 
to implement a range of policies.  For the first three 
decades of its rule, most of these policies were economic 
and developmental.  In the wake of World War Two, 
however, new challenges arose.  The new United Nations 
mandate advocated rapid political development and 
preparation for independence in the colony.  Triennial 
Visiting Missions insisted on the first steps towards the 
democratisation of the indigenous political system.  At the 
same time, a new generation of Catholic missionaries and 
clergy brought anti-racial and egalitarian values to 
Rwanda after experiencing the Holocaust in Europe 
(Mamdani 2001; Linden 1977).  Many Hutu children were 
now receiving a rudimentary education, there were 
increased opportunities for Hutu in the emerging monetary 
economy, and through further education in the 
seminaries.  These factors led to the emergence of a Hutu 
consciousness in the mid-1950s, or what has been dubbed 
the ‘Hutu awakening’.  For the first time, race became a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Germany was ‘allocated’ territory that included Rwanda at the 
Berlin Conference in 1885, but the first German to arrive in the 
country did not do so until 1894. Belgium occupied Rwanda in 
1916 in the course of World War One, the legitimacy of the 
occupation was confirmed under a League of Nations mandate in 
1923.  
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contested political issue.  In just a few short years, Hutu-
Tutsi divisions led to the first major outbreak of interethnic 




Arguably, three key factors combine to explain the very 
rapid and extreme polarisation of Hutu-Tutsi divisions, and 
the resulting interethnic violence.  First, the critical nature 
of this issue to the nascent Hutu counter-elite cannot be 
underestimated.  For this first generation of politically 
conscious Hutu, race was not one political problem 
amongst the many challenges that beset Rwanda, but the 
central issue, and the lens through which all other 
developmental issues were approached.  In March 1957 
this became apparent with the publication of the Bahutu 
Manifesto.  Signed by nine members of the Hutu counter-
elite, including future Rwandan president Grégoire 
Kayibanda, it has been described as “probably the most 
important document in modern Rwandan political 
development” (Wagoner 1968: 158).  The Bahutu 
Manifesto challenged every facet of Rwandan society: 
 
Some people have asked whether this is a social or a racial 
conflict … In reality and in the minds of men it is both.  It can, 
however, be narrowed down for it is primarily a question of a 
political monopoly held by one race, the Mututsi, and, in view of 
the social situation as a whole, it has become an economic and 
social monopoly.  In view, also, of the de facto selection in 
education, this political, economic and social monopoly has also 
become a cultural monopoly, to the great despair of the Bahutu, 
who see themselves condemned forever to the role of 
subordinate manual workers, and this, worse still, after achieving 
an independence which they will have unwittingly helped to 
obtain (Niyonzima and others 1957: 3). 
 
The Bahutu Manifesto identified a range of problems 
facing Rwanda and even proposed numerous solutions – 
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all of them highlighting a fundamental racial component.  
Thus integral to Rwanda’s economic development was 
reform of the land ownership system, based upon 
traditional Tutsi privilege; while integral to education 
development was equitable access to education and 
government-funded scholarships (Niyonzima and others 
1957).  Political development required “that Bahutu should 
in fact be promoted to public office”, and that positions 
such as sub-chiefs and chiefs should be elected by 
taxpayers (Niyonzima and others 1957: 8).  For the Hutu 
counter-elite, the fundamental problem was Tutsi racial 
privilege, and addressing this issue was crucial for all 
areas of Rwanda’s political and economic development.   
 
The Bahutu Manifesto was prepared to highlight the 
critical issue of race relations to the 1957 UN Visiting 
Mission.  The Visiting Mission also received a starkly 
different account of race relations in Rwanda, however, in 
Mise au Point, the Statement of Views.  Published by the 
Superior Council, comprising Rwanda’s Tutsi political elite, 
the Statement of Views also viewed race relations as “the 
fundamental problem in our country now” (High Council of 
State 1957: Annex II).  Yet astonishingly, this statement 
was not referring to the problems of Hutu-Tutsi race 
relations – which did not rate a mention in the entire 
document – but race relations between whites and non-
whites in the country.  This highlights the high degree of 
racial awareness and the hierarchical nature of Rwandan 
society, but also a strong desire to de-emphasise the 
Hutu-Tutsi distinction and recast Rwanda as a 
homogenous nation in a bid for the elite to retain its 
power (Atterbury 1970).  The primary focus of the 
Statement of Views was on preparing Rwanda for rapid 
independence, through proper training, recognition and 
utilisation of the current indigenous elite (Wagoner 1968).  
Self-government was an interim goal, and the Statement 
noted “It would be difficult at the present to specify when 
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it will be possible to grant us self-government, but we are 
anxious that we should be trained for self-government 
now” (High Council of State 1957: Annex II).  The 
Superior Council’s desire for rapid self-government, and 
omission of the Hutu-Tutsi issue, reflected an awareness 
of the potential threat posed by the nascent Hutu political 
movement, and a response designed “so they, the Tutsi, 
could use the machinery of government to maintain their 
power” (Webster 1966: 40). Both the Bahutu Manifesto 
and the Statement of Views were key documents in that 
they “provided the ideological basis for much of the 
political action which followed” (Webster 1966: 40; Harroy 
1984: 237). 
 
The second factor that contributed to the rapid ethnic 
polarisation of Rwanda during this period is the lack of 
responsiveness of both the Belgian colonial authorities and 
the UN Visiting Missions to this critical issue.  Despite the 
Bahutu Manifesto and the Statement of Views, arguably 
neither authority realised the importance or disintegrative 
potential of the race relations issue prior to late 1959.  
The 1954 Visiting Mission completed failed to mention the 
problem of sub-group identity, and it was left to the 
Belgians to point this out in criticising their report (United 
Nations 1955: 47). Yet the Belgian authorities themselves 
made no attempts to address the issue.  In 1956, a 
proposal to include Hutu representation on the (colonial-
led) General Council of Ruanda-Urundi was defeated, 
leading its only proponent to resign.  In a parting shot, Mr. 
Maus bemoaned “the conflict of interests between the 
Tutsi and Hutu communities which is the most pressing 
social problem and the most poignant human drama in the 
Territory, will therefore continue to be officially ignored by 
our institutions” (United Nations 1960: 40).  
 
The Bahutu Manifesto and Statement of Views ensured at 
least some level of official acknowledgement of the race 
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relations issue in 1957, but led to little real action.  The 
UN Visiting Mission welcomed “the increasing rate at which 
the traditional society in Ruanda-Urundi is adapting itself 
to modern democratic ideas and forms” (United Nations 
1957: 9). Yet it also acknowledged, for the first time, that 
the acceleration of political development for which 
previous Missions had pressed so strenuously might be a 
cause of political turmoil (Rawson 1966): 
 
The inevitable disintegration of such a civilisation [traditional 
Rwandan society] on contact with the modern world and its 
replacement by new forms may give rise to serious difficulties in 
spite of all the Administering Authority’s vigilance (United 
Nations 1957: 12). 
 
While noting the “especially delicate stage” of Rwanda’s 
political development, it had little to offer of value, with 
hazy statements such as “Without minimising the danger 
of haste, the Mission believes that over-cautiousness is no 
less dangerous” (United Nations 1957: 12). The only 
practical suggestion it proposed – with extraordinary 
optimism – was further education:  
 
Under the influence of secondary and university education and of 
contact with the outside world, traditional conceptions are giving 
way and the elite of the old regime are coming up against a new 
elite.  It will not be long – and indeed there are already 
indications of this – before the traditional political structure and 
the respect for feudal institutions will be as irksome to the rising 
generation of young educated Batutsi as to the new Bahutu elite 
(United Nations 1957: 23). 
 
The 1957 Mission appeared to seriously underestimate 
both the importance and severity of the issues 
surrounding race relations in Rwanda.   
 
There is conflicting evidence as to how seriously the 
Belgian Administering Authorities regarded the Hutu-Tutsi 
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problem.  Certainly they recognised the “deep cleavages 
which divide the Batutsi, the Bahutu [and] the Batwa ... 
Those cleavages are obvious ... and they dominate the 
whole of social life” (United Nations 1955: 47).  But the 
stratified nature of society in Rwanda had been 
uncontested for decades – and indeed utilised as the basis 
of indirect rule – and the new Hutu challenge to Tutsi 
domination appears not to have been perceived as a 
pressing issue prior to the Hutu uprising in late 1959.  
Afterwards, this rapidly changed, and the report of the 
1960 Visiting Mission claimed that “In his discussions with 
the 1957 Visiting Mission, the Governor described relations 
between the Tutsi and Hutu as the key problem of the 
Territory” (United Nations 1960: 42).  But if that was the 
case, it was not clearly described as such in either the 
1957 report, or Belgium’s annual reports on the Trust 
Territory.  Indeed, a careful reading of documents during 
this period suggests that Vice-Governor General Jean-Paul 
Harroy did not concede until December 1958 that “the 
Hutu-Tutsi question posed an undeniable problem” – some 
twenty-two months after the Bahutu Manifesto’s 
publication (Lemarchand 1970: 152).   
 
To the extent that the problem was recognised, the 
Administering Authorities appeared unsure how to address 
it. The General Council of Ruanda-Urundi passed a motion 
to study the Manifesto, but repeatedly postponed 
discussion of the Hutu-Tutsi polarisation (United Nations 
1960). Governor Harroy initially adopted a stance that 
aligned closely with the position of the Tutsi elite, 
suggesting that the Hutu-Tutsi problem was largely an 
economic (rather than racial) issue, and warning of 
‘misuse’ of the terms Hutu and Tutsi (United Nations 
1960). This aligned with the Administration’s early position 
in favour of abolishing the terms Hutu and Tutsi – a 
position advocated by the Tutsi elite but strongly opposed 
in the Bahutu Manifesto for its potential to mask 
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discrimination (Niyonzima et al 1957: 11). As the 
democratisation process gathered pace ahead of 
anticipated independence, it did so in an environment of 
increasing polarisation.   
 
The third, critical factor that contributed to the extremity 
of the ethnic polarisation was the confluence of the race 
relations issue with the democratisation and independence 
process.  The rapid pace of decolonisation precluded the 
use of longer term conciliatory and ameliorative policies 
that might have improved Hutu-Tutsi relations over time.  
Rather, each side perceived the issue as immediate rather 
than chronic, and one that must be resolved prior to 
independence.  Increasingly, that resolution came to be 
visualised as through a ‘victory’ of one group at the 
expense of the other. By 1959 the disastrous potential of 
the convergence of the race relations issue and the 
independence process was clear.  Observer M.A. 
Munyangaju summed up the atmosphere on 30 January: 
 
The situation is very tense between Bahutu and Batutsi.  A small 
quarrel would be enough for starting off a ranged battle.  The 
Batutsi realise that after this, everything is finished for them and 
are preparing for the last chance.  The Bahutu also see that a 
trial of strength is in the making and do not wish to give up 
(Quoted in Bhattacharyya 1967: 218). 
 
Race was the political issue when political parties were 
allowed to form. Thus the founding charter of Union 
Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), the party of the Tutsi elite, 
declared in August 1959:  
 
Although the Ruandais society is composed of individuals of 
highly unequal value, and it is not equitable to accord the same 
value to the vulgar thoughts of the ordinary man as to the 
perspicacious judgment of the capable ... Although universal 
suffrage will infallibly end in the enslavement of the educated 
minority by an uncultivated majority ... It is nevertheless 
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impossible to refuse universal suffrage to the Bahutu.  An open 
opposition will provide one more argument to the colonists 
whose civilisation ... [and] loyalty is now known (UNAR Charter, 
in Nkundabagenzi 1961, translation utilised from Bhattacharyya 
1967: 248). 
 
The most popular Hutu party, Mouvement Démocratique 
Rwandais / Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu 
(MDR-PARMEHUTU), announced its goal as “a true union 
of all the Rwandan people without any race dominating 
another as is the case today” (Manifeste-Programme du 
Parmehutu 1959, in Nkundabagenzi 1961: 113). The few, 
quiet proponents of moderation received little support.  
The bitterness of the debate is further illustrated by a 
September 1959 press release from the Hutu social party 
APROSOMA, which began “The plans of the Tutsi party in 
Ruanda – representing the Tutsi who are exploiters by 
nature, zenophobes [sic] by instinct and communists by 
necessity ...” (United Nations 1959:1). By November of 
1959, these divisive, race-based politics contributed to the 
outbreak of the Hutu uprising, the first major incident of 




Ultimately, Rwanda was nation forged from a violent, 
divisive and racially-driven independence process.  After 
the 1959 uprising, race relations continued to polarise and 
radicalise, despite some moderating efforts by the Belgian 
colonial authorities and the UN Trusteeship authorities. 
There were repeated incidents of ethnic violence through 
to the nation’s independence in July 1962 and beyond. For 
the Tutsi elite and Hutu counter-elite, at least, the 
potential for this polarisation had been apparent from 
1957. As the 1960 Visiting Mission to Rwanda remarked 
about the Bahutu Manifesto and the Statement of Views: 
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Those two documents contain the germ of all the ideological 
elements which inspired the disturbances of November 1959 and 
led to the Visiting Mission being received in Ruanda in March 
1960 with mutually contradictory slogans: “Immediate 
independence.  Get rid of the Belgians for us” and “Down with 
Tutsi feudalism.  Long live Belgian Trusteeship” (United Nations 
1960: 41-42). 
 
Yet neither the Belgian Administration nor the Visiting 
Missions appear to have fully appreciated the critical 
nature of the race relations issue until it resulted in the 
first major outbreak of violence. It can only be speculated 
as to whether earlier recognition of the critical nature of 
race relations by the colonial authorities, and a more 
decisive response to the emerging polarisation, could have 
averted some of the violence that eventually resulted.  
Unfortunately, however, by the time the severity of the 
issue was properly recognised, the political environment 
was already highly polarised and opportunities for 
reconciliation severely circumscribed. Rwanda was born a 
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